# Deception–*Magic!*

John Davis

German bombers rumble relentlessly across the night sky of North Africa following a radio beam directed from German-occupied Libya toward the British port of Alexandria, Egypt. The flight commander notes an anomaly. The beam directs him forward, but he can see the lights of Alexandria to his left. The beam is known to be correct, but below him are city lights. Not only can he see the few inevitable lights in violation of blackout, he can easily see ships' lights in the harbor. He turns toward the lights and bombs . . . nothing.

In Africa during World War II, German bombers were led astray by an English deception plan that included mimicking Alexandria harbor. Creating the illusion of the actual city, lit by false house and ship lights, British officer Jasper Maskelyne, a professional magician, deceived the deadly German bombers into dropping their bombs 8 miles from Alexandria.

Deception on the battlefield is a force multiplier whose target is the adversary's mind as much as his technology. Deception can be countered by understanding the rules that govern suggestion or, better said, magic.

Successful deception events are occurring worldwide. Despite being monitored by sophisticated surveillance techniques and technology, India exploded a nuclear device under the world's nose. In Kosovo, the Serbs used fake tanks to drain away allied air sorties. Artillery that the Vietnamese "did not have" at Dien Bien Phu appeared as if by magic after having been secretly delivered from the Korean peninsula. In each case, the adversary was well and truly deceived.

## Appearance, Belief, Enticement

The great Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu wrote, "All war is deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable. . . . When we are near, we must make the enemy believe that we are far way. [We must] hold out baits to entice the enemy."[1] Almost every U.S. Army officer has read Sun Tzu's words. Yet, the U.S. military is little prepared for deception operations, which comprise a significant component of information operations. Why?

U.S. analysts tend to misinterpret Sun Tzu's text. Americans are a pragmatic, formulaic, and technology-trusting people. Sun Tzu uses verbs that refer to the mind, emphasizing appearance, belief, and enticement. How something seems or appears, what is believed, and enticement are activities discerned by the mind, not by technology. Deception in war deceives first the mind, then the eye. Few U.S. military analysts would dispute this, but fewer still offer assessments as if they believe it.

Basic military intelligence apparatus is sensory. We use platforms to see and hear the enemy. We base assessments on what is perceived as cold, rational fact. Appearance, belief, and enticement are mental, not sensory words. The U.S. military interprets enemy activities based on what can be seen, heard, and touched.

When a weaker country confronts a great power, the weaker knows it must employ deception to prevail. The U.S. Army's lack of ability in recognizing deception makes it not only vulnerable but also weaker because deception is a force multiplier.

The principles of magic, which all of us—especially children—enjoy, include the following:

- Disappearance.
- Appearance.
- Transposition of objects.
- Physical change in an object.
- Apparent defiance of natural law.
- Invisible sources of motion.
- Mental phenomena.

These principles also govern deception. We all know the old adage that the hand is quicker than the eye. The magician seems to deceive the eye, but this is not true. The hand is not quicker than the eye. The magician actually beguiles the eye. In war, an opponent tries to beguile his adversary's perception. What appears factual might actually be an artful creation with which to convince the adversary that it is real. Properly understood, these principles can be used to assess the battlefield, to assess intelligence reports, and to defeat deception attempts.

## Deceiving the Mind

Before the enemy employs deception, he must analyze the situation, because to defeat his enemy, he must first understand how the enemy thinks. He can then orchestrate the adversary's responses. He will work to understand the enemy better than the enemy understands himself, then he will deceive the enemy's brain, not his eye.

**The Germans v. the Soviets I.** Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin despised and feared English Prime Minister Winston Churchill more than he did German dictator Adolf Hitler. Indeed, we know that in 1941 Stalin believed that reports of an imminent German attack were part of a brilliant British disinformation campaign, not a brilliant German deception operation. Even when undeniable Wehrmacht military buildups were observed and reported by communist spies, Stalin dismissed the reports because the Germans had orchestrated an illusion that played to Stalin's fears of the British.

The Germans suggested that the buildups were simply to pressure the Soviets for concessions in an upcoming parlay, making Stalin believe the buildups were in no way a prelude to war. In fact, when a German diplomat stated that war was imminent, Stalin believed and asserted that the nefarious disinformation had reached the ambassadorial level. The Germans had only to convince Stalin of their benign intent until they were ready to

launch the great assault of Operation Barbarossa.

**The Germans v. the Soviets II.** In World War II, during the battle of Stalingrad, massed Soviet gunfire suppressed German artillery batteries one by one. Even when the Germans were out of sight, crater analysis served Red Army intelligence sufficiently well to blast enemy gunners. Except for one battery, the German guns were silenced. This unseen battery fired away, despite massive counterbattery fire.

Soviet analysts plotted and targeted every meter of ground near where the guns could possibly be. Yet the Germans kept firing and killing Russians by the score. The mystery was only solved after the Germans surrendered. The wily battery commander had hammered his guns into the frozen Vistula River. Thus, he appeared to be defying natural law. The facts did not change; the enemy's brain had been tricked.

**The Germans v. the British.** Nordpol was the code name of a German deception operation practiced against England early in World War II. British-trained agents were dropped into Holland from secret night flights. Each agent had a radio with which to contact London to vouch for his safe arrival and subsequent actions. Despite the fact that when reports began to come in they did not include confirmation codes, the British never suspected that the operation was compromised. Only when one of the imprisoned British agents escaped was the truth revealed.

Desire to believe something is true can cause the denial of confirmatory observations. In this case it was often believed that the agents were too tired or too mentally drained to identify themselves properly. The allies ascribed reasons to each and every inaccurate message. The Germans gave just enough true information to offset any total reassessment by the English agents. Thus, a subtle form of disappearance was used. The absence of confirmatory codes was explained away by simply allowing the British to fill in the reason themselves. After all, were not valid, if relatively insignificant, messages coming from the agents on the ground?

German counterintelligence personnel knew that a deception must fool the prevailing adversarial interpretive mind. They understood that when bureaucracies vouch for something, they are virtually impervious to change thereafter. When the first captured British-trained agent's confirmation was believed by his English handlers, the Germans concluded the others would be also. The Germans knew that the most difficult path for any analyst was to try to counter received opinion, particularly in the intelligence field. If the high command said all was well, who were the analysts to argue?

**The Arabs v. the United States.** The Arab world regularly denounces the U.S. media's stereotypical portrayal of its inhabitants as Middle Eastern terrorists. Osama bin-Laden exploited this situation when, instead of attacking embassies in the Middle East, his followers blew up two U.S. embassies in Africa, where the attack was a total surprise. The sudden appearance of Arab terrorists in benign backwater countries far from disputed areas was something the United States had never suspected or planned for.

**The Russians v. the Chechens.** During the recent Chechen rebellion against Russia, the Russians trapped Chechen rebels in Grozny. The rebels offered the Russians hundreds of thousands of dollars to allow Chechen fighters to escape safely through a minefield that surrounded the beleaguered city. The Chechens knew Russian corruption well. In fact, they had bought many weapons and much ammunition from the Russians for money and hashish. Why not pay to survive to be able to fight another day?

The money was passed, the path through the minefield was cleared, and the day of escape approached. At dawn, the Chechens entered the minefield. To their shock, the Russians, using registered artillery fire, began firing on the Chechens, forcing them to run in panic into areas where the mines had not been cleared. A Russian general commented later that what surprised him was that the Chechens believed the Russians at all.

Chechen perception of what was true about individual mercenary practices was not true about the Russians' relentless will as a group. Russian individual corruption could not be extrapolated to the entire army. We can learn from this that we can be deceived by our own preconceptions when falsely applied to known facts.

## What the Mind Believes

Many people still debate whether British and American double agents Kim Philby and Alger Hiss were actually guilty of spying for the enemy. They were of a certain social class, therefore many people consider the possibility that they could have been traitors inconceivable. If all members of a leading social class are loyal, how can they betray their country? The trick was observable, but the mind did not want to *believe.* Even when Hiss appeared in the Venona decrypts, his supporters refused to believe he was guilty. If Philby and Hiss were guilty, a veritable "natural law" was compromised.

During World War II in North Africa before the attack at El Alamein, the British were confronted with the problem of how to hide thousands of barrels of gasoline. The solution was to line the barrels up side by side, snug against the edge of abandoned trenches that had been dug months earlier. The German analyst, having viewed the same trenches in dozens of aerial photos, would not notice that the trench shadow was just a little wider than before. What *appeared* to be truck parks with lazy campfires nearby confirmed for the analyst the absence of danger. Yet, when the British attacked, it was with well-fueled tanks that had been hidden under fiberboard truck covers. The attack turned the tide in the Sahara in favor of the British. Transposition of objects helped defeat German aerial observers because although they observed the field of battle, they never really saw it.

During World War I, when the Arabs revolted against the Turks, British military liaison T.E. Lawrence and Arabian tribesmen appeared to be mired in a torpid, sleepy Wadi, unable to take a major town or, indeed, to even formulate a plan. Suddenly Lawrence and his compatriots struck as if from nowhere to take the town of Aqaba. The Turks were shocked because they believed that the wide, sandy wastes could not be crossed.

In World War II, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur believed the Chinese army incapable of advance without detection by the United States' superior aerial intelligence systems.

Chinese General Mao Zedong's army advanced by night, using the threat of death to keep the men under cover by day. They took U.S. troops by surprise by secretly crossing the Yalu.

Appeared (seemed), believed, enticed; these are abstract words; words of the mind, not of technology. U.S. analysts must be aware of preconceptions. They must ask themselves what they believe to be true. This is perhaps the hardest question they can ask themselves. Whoever answers this question will best be able to use, or defeat, deception. This casts into high relief what Sun Tzu meant when he said, "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear a hundred battles."[2]

## Exploiting Beliefs

If we know ourselves, we have identified the first target of an adversary's deception. We can then ask how the enemy might try to deceive us. What is he doing to exploit our beliefs? What is he doing to make us believe something? How is he making himself appear? What will he try to entice us into doing? Using these concepts to manipulate us can be powerful force multipliers to a determined enemy.

If we apply counterdeception, which corresponds to an awareness of the principles of suggestion as used in magic, we can begin to interpret an adversary's schemes. The power of suggestion, or magic, has been used for thousands of years. The old adage, "we are not deceived; we deceive ourselves," is only true if we allow it to be. ***MR***

### NOTES

1. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, chapter 1, verses 18-20.
2. Ibid., chapter 3, verse 18.

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# Ensuring Military Justice

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Commanders at every level know that ensuring military justice is a mission of the greatest importance; however, not all commanders know how to accomplish this. An abundance of information is available on military justice, and there is certainly no shortage of Army lawyers to advise commanders on these matters. Nevertheless, ensuring justice is a difficult mission.

The burden placed on commanders to fashion just the right punishment to suit each and every offense in a unit requires a delicate balance between the seriousness of the offense and the quality of the soldier. While no magic formula exists to ensure justice in every case, there are some standard guidelines for commanders to follow when handling military-justice matters.

## Know the Mission

In military justice, the first thing commanders must understand is the mission—*to do justice*. Until commanders fully understand and appreciate this concept, they cannot ensure justice in their units.

The concept of justice sounds simple enough, but it is often complex when applied to specific cases. Recently, when asked how he ensured justice in his command, a general officer responded that he treated every case as if the suspect were his own son or daughter. He worked hard to ensure that he knew all the facts of the case and to give the soldier the benefit of all doubt. When imposing punishment, he made sure he knew the soldier's background and personality well enough to make the right decisions, just as he would in the case of his own children. This standard is a good one for commanders to remember and apply. Other abiding concepts will also help ensure justice.

**Give justice high priority.** When commanders are constantly faced with competing priorities, there is the temptation to take short cuts to get things done. When it comes to justice, there can be no short cuts. Justice is a mission that deserves the highest regard and the fullest attention to detail. There is simply no substitute for doing things right. Commanders should take whatever time is necessary to gather facts, obtain advice, and make the correct decisions.

**Keep an open mind**. Commanders must not prejudge cases. Until they have gathered all the facts and learned all relevant information about the case, they are in no position to do justice. Often, the first reports of misconduct are incomplete and sometimes inaccurate. By not jumping to conclusions about the case, commanders will be in a better position to calmly and objectively gather all the facts and respond appropriately to the incident. A commander without an open mind is like an infantry division without its cavalry. The commander will be operating blindly, which is catastrophic not only in warfare, but also in military justice.

**Have moral courage.** Commanders must have the moral courage to take the "hard right over the easy wrong." In military-justice cases, matters are often neither black nor white, but shades of gray. Gathering all the facts in a given case, learning the quality of the soldier involved, and understanding and applying the law are difficult and time-consuming tasks. On occasion, it is easy and lazy to make presumptions in the absence of facts, ignore the quality of the soldier, and either ignore or reject the applicable law. Commanders must resist the temptation to take this low road. Concerned parents would not treat their children this way. Soldiers deserve no less.

**Err on the side of the soldier**. Because evidence is sometimes ambiguous, conflicting, unclear, or uncertain, commanders often have to make decisions under less than desirable conditions. When faced with such situations, commanders should remember that the burden of proof is not on the soldier, but on the command. If the evidence does not meet the standard of proof, the suspect is considered not guilty.[1] In close cases, the commander should give the soldier the benefit of the doubt because the U.S. system of jurisprudence holds that in a close case, it is better to find a guilty party blame-

less than to take the chance of convicting an innocent party. This fundamental principle is the foundation of the U.S. criminal-justice system, and it is this controlling principle that commanders should follow in deciding difficult cases.

## Know the Facts

In handling military-justice matters, it is critically important that commanders know the facts of each case. Discovering the facts of any case generally requires an investigation. The Criminal Investigation Division investigates more-serious offenses, while Military Police Investigations investigates less-serious offenses. During a Commander's Inquiry or under the administrative procedures of Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, *Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers*, the local command is responsible for investigating other cases.[2] Whatever the vehicle commanders use for the investigation, the most important thing is that the investigation be detailed and thorough.

A good investigation will answer all relevant questions and resolve all issues regarding the commission of offenses. Commanders must thoroughly read reports of investigation and satisfy themselves that they know and understand all the facts. If a report of investigation fails to answer any relevant questions or resolve any important issues, commanders should request or direct a follow-up investigation to answer these questions, resolve inconsistencies, or address unresolved issues, including following up on any misconduct raised for the first time by the initial investigation. If a follow-up investigation is insufficient, commanders should not hesitate to request or direct additional investigations until such time as they are satisfied that all the relevant facts needed to make the best possible decision are known.

Because unresolved military justice matters can have negative effects on unit morale, commanders should expedite investigations to resolve cases as soon as practicable. Waiting for a resolution can be especially hard on soldiers who are the focus of an investigation. Nevertheless, a thorough and detailed investigation is indispensable to achieving justice, and it should not be sacrificed in the interest of time.

Commanders must be deliberate and dogged when developing and discovering facts. Given a choice between expeditious resolution on one hand and detailed, deliberate investigation on the other hand, the commander should err on the side of conducting a thorough, detailed investigation. Commanders should consult with the command judge advocate early and often to ensure compliance with procedural and substantive legal requirements. They should also consult judge advocates regarding sufficiency of evidence and the need for further investigation.

## Know the Soldier

The commander should get to know the soldier involved in a case. Knowing the soldier is equally as important as knowing the facts. Every soldier is unique, and the commander must consider each soldier's merits. No commander should ever make the mistake of deciding cases solely on the offense committed without taking into consideration the particular soldier involved. To do otherwise is to deny the soldier the justice the system demands.

To illustrate the importance of knowing the soldier, consider the following example. Two soldiers act together in missing a morning accountability formation. They are discovered later that morning at their respective duty stations and appear to be drunk on duty. The first soldier is a 19-year-old private who has been in the unit 8 months. He is an outstanding duty performer who has never before been in trouble. The second soldier is a 24-year-old specialist on his second tour of duty. He is a mediocre duty performer who has engaged in a series of minor acts of misconduct since arriving in the unit 2 years previously. Without knowing the background and personality of these two soldiers, the commander would logically punish them equally since both committed the same offense. However, because of differences in age, military experience, duty performance, and disciplinary records, the commander should probably punish the second soldier more harshly than the first. In other words, ensuring justice in a given case is specific to the individual soldier, not just the offense committed. This is a critical principle for commanders to remember and apply.

How does a commander come to know each soldier? In some cases, the commander will already have personal knowledge of the soldier, based on the commander's personal observations and prior interactions with the soldier. In many cases, however, because of the large size of the unit, the commander's knowledge will be limited because of the difficulty in getting to know all unit members well. Accordingly, commanders must rely on other sources of information concerning soldiers, such as the chain of supervision and soldiers' personnel records.

Supervisors know soldiers best because of the frequency of direct contact they have with soldiers. This is especially true of first-line supervisors. Commanders should consult supervisors early and often about soldiers involved in a case. On occasion, a commander's determination of guilt or innocence will turn on the issue of credibility. Supervisors are generally in the best position to provide information on a soldier's credibility. When practicable, the commander should consult the entire chain of supervision. Not surprisingly, members of the chain of supervision might have differing opinions about a soldier, which can often give the commander a better perspective of the soldier.

Personnel records are the other key source for learning about soldiers.[3] Before making key decisions, commanders should carefully and thoroughly review soldiers' personnel records, which contain a wealth of important information. Length of service, date of rank, prior assignments, family status, and other personal information appear in the records. Also, counseling statements and evaluation reports reflect the quality of the soldier's duty performance.

The records also contain past misconduct records, such as Article 15s and letters of reprimand, prior reductions in grade, and any prior military or civilian felony convictions. These records often reveal summarized entries of personnel information, favorable and unfavorable, that require the commander to follow up to discern important details about the soldier.[4]

The commander should carefully read all counseling records, especially

those of lower-grade enlisted soldiers since they do not receive written evaluation reports. In short, the commander should carefully read all relevant personnel records and consider the information when deciding the appropriate disposition in a case.

## Know Disciplinary Options

Before taking any action, a commander should know and understand all available options for disposing of cases of misconduct, including punitive options such as courts-martial, Article 15s, and adverse administrative actions such as letters of reprimand and administrative elimination actions. Too often, commanders are unaware of all the options. This is especially true of adverse administrative options. As a consequence, some cases are disposed of inappropriately or less appropriately than desired.

Appendix A of the *Senior Officer Legal Orientation Deskbook* is a chart of all available administrative options for disposing of cases of misconduct.[5] Commanders should review or consider this chart, along with appropriate punitive options, in connection with all cases of misconduct. By considering all available options, commanders are more likely to ensure proper disposition of cases, which in turn will ensure better justice in individual cases.

## Know Consequences and Effects of Options

Commanders too often make disciplinary decisions without knowing or fully appreciating the administrative consequences of their decisions. As a result, they can inadvertently expose soldiers to greater or lesser punishments than intended. Suppose a commander were to impose an Article 15 on Staff Sergeant Jane Doe for showing up late for duty and being drunk on duty. Both events occur on the same morning. Doe admits to the offenses and apologizes for her lapse in judgment. She explains that her conduct was a direct result of emotional turmoil she is experiencing because of a bitter divorce. Her actions do not reflect her normal conduct, which has been exemplary in every way. Realizing this, the commander seeks to impose light punishment because he does not wish to cause permanent harm to Doe's career. At the Article 15 hearing, the commander only imposes extra duty, restriction, and a significant forfeiture of pay, but he does not reduce her in grade. However, he elects to file the Article 15 in the performance section of Doe's Official Personnel Military File (OPMF). As a consequence, Doe becomes vulnerable to a U.S. Department of the Army (DA)-directed bar to reenlistment.[6] This was an unintended consequence of the commander's filing determination. The commander had wanted to make a record of Doe's misconduct, but he did not intend to expose her to a possible bar to reenlistment.

In another example, First Lieutenant Able Sentry is apprehended for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The commanding general (CG) imposes an administrative letter of reprimand as required by regulation.[7] The chain of command recommends in writing that the CG file the letter of reprimand in Sentry's OMPF.[8] The CG accepts the filing recommendation and directs that the letter be filed in Sentry's OMPF.

In addition to the letter of reprimand, the CG offers Sentry an Article 15. Later, during the Article 15 hearing, the CG is surprised when the chain of command orally recommends filing the Article 15 in the restricted section of Sentry's OMPF. The CG asks the chain of command why it recommends filing the Article 15 in the restricted section of the OMPF when it had already recommended that the letter of reprimand be filed in Sentry's OMPF. The chain of command responds that when it recommended filing the reprimand in Sentry's OMPF, it assumed the reprimand would automatically be filed in the restricted section of Sentry's OMPF. The CG explains that filing letters of reprimand in the restricted section of the OMPF is not a legal option. All such reprimands must be placed in the performance section of the OMPF. The chain of command realizes too late that the reprimand has been placed in Sentry's performance OMPF where promotion boards and other DA boards that review his file will see it and consider it when reviewing Sentry's file.

Except for this reprimand, Sentry has had an outstanding military record, and until the DWI, he was thought to be one of the best lieutenants in the brigade. At the next captain's selection board, he is nonselected for promotion, and he becomes the unintended victim of his chain of command's lack of understanding of the consequences of an OMPF filing.

Consider the case of Major (Promotable) Bill Liar. Liar requested and received permission to take leave for 5 days—Monday through Friday. He returned 7 days later, but claimed that he actually returned from leave on Friday, the fifth day. The garrison commander's investigation determined that Liar did not return to his unit until late Sunday night, the seventh day. The garrison commander gave Liar an Article 15 for being absent without leave. The garrison commander imposed the maximum punishment and directed the action be filed in the performance section of Liar's OMPF.

Six months later, the garrison commander notices that Liar has been promoted to lieutenant colonel (LTC). The garrison commander wonders how Liar could have been promoted when an Article 15 has been filed in his performance OMPF. The adjutant informs the garrison commander that once the punishment was served, the "flag" was lifted, and Liar was eligible for promotion.[9] The garrison commander is livid. He thought the Article 15 automatically removed Liar from the LTC promotion list. The adjutant advises him that there is no such automatic action. The adjutant then advises the garrison commander that if he had wanted Liar to be removed from the LTC promotion list, he should have initiated such an action.[10] Frustrated and angry, the garrison commander storms off convinced that Liar's promotion was a clear injustice. Had he known that removal from the promotion list was not automatic, he would have initiated removal action. In this case, he has only himself to blame for failing to understand the administrative consequences of his actions.

The examples above illustrate how important it is for commanders to understand the administrative consequences of disciplinary actions. To learn these consequences, commanders should coordinate all actions with the command judge advocate and adjutant. More important, since judge advocates and adjutants are not always fully aware of consequences themselves, commanders

should direct them to research these consequences before the commander takes disciplinary action. As always, commanders are ultimately responsible for ensuring that they impose as much punishment as they intend—no more and no less.

## Ask for Chain of Command Input

There is no substitute for getting input from the chain of command or chain of supervision regarding appropriate disposition of misconduct.[11] Supervisors and superiors in the chain of command or supervision provide critical information to commanders about each soldier's duty performance, attitude, value to the unit, past misconduct, and rehabilitative potential. This is especially true for first-line supervisors, who generally know soldiers best. Supervisors can also tell the commander what, if any, counseling or rehabilitative efforts have been conducted in the past. Supervisors also provide essential information about the effect of a given offense on the unit.

Supervisors are of the greatest value in determining appropriate disposition of cases, including providing input to the commander on the appropriate level of punishment. When practical, the commander should consult in person with supervisors and superiors in the soldier's chain of command. This will provide them the opportunity to ask follow-up questions and to acquire important background information. On occasion, this will cause delay in disposing of cases, but such delay is justified in the interest of justice. If asking for personal input from the chain of command is not practical, the commander should get input in writing, at a minimum. Written input should include the following:

- Duty performance, past misconduct, rehabilitative potential, past counseling, and when practical, written support documentation (counseling statements, evaluation reports, past letters of reprimand or Article 15s).
- Recommended disposition (Article 15, letter of reprimand, memorandum of concern, counseling).
- Past rehabilitative efforts and other remedial measures.
- Type and amount of punishment, if appropriate (reduction in grade, suspended punishment, forfeitures).
- Filing determination, if appropriate (OPMF, local filing, performance section of the OPMF, restricted section of the OPMF).

Even when members of the chain of command or supervision are on temporary duty, on leave, or deployed, their written input should be obtained except in the most unusual circumstances.

## Maintain Two-Way Communication

Handling cases of misconduct is an unpleasant but necessary part of command. For soldiers charged with or suspected of misconduct, the experience is personal. In many cases, the day of the Article 15 hearing (administrative proceeding, trial, or other disposition) is the most important day in the soldier's life. No one in the system, except perhaps the victim, if there is a victim, has as much at stake. The soldier could possibly lose pay, rank, military career, or freedom. The soldier might also face social stigma, public embarrassment, loss of esteem, and other such unpleasantness.[12] Because of what is at stake, and in the best interest of justice, it is critically important that the commander keep the soldier abreast of the status of the case and be allowed to have input in the process.

Where appropriate, the commander should remember the presumption of innocence and keep the soldier informed of the status of the case. Rarely will a soldier be completely unaware of being under investigation. Even more rarely will there be a good reason not to inform the soldier of the status of an investigation.[13]

Normally, a soldier under investigation experiences emotions ranging from minor annoyance to extreme anxiety and depression. At times these emotions are an unavoidable byproduct of the situation. At other times, uncertainty regarding the status of the investigation and the command's response will cause or heighten emotions. Commanders should therefore ensure that soldiers are periodically advised of the status of the investigation, including an estimate of when the investigation will be completed, a summary of the decisionmaking process, and who the decisionmaker will be. If a lawyer represents the soldier, the commander should provide the information to the soldier's lawyer after consulting with the command judge advocate. In this way, the soldier is likely to be less emotional about the investigation and more productive while the matter is pending.

Ensure the soldier gets the opportunity to give his version of the facts. As a matter of law, soldiers have certain rights that must be protected, including the right to remain silent when confronted with charges and the right to have an attorney present during questioning.[14] Notwithstanding these protections, many soldiers want to waive their rights to remain silent or to ask for legal representation when giving their version of events. Allowing soldiers this opportunity is fundamental to ensuring fairness. Often, the commander can only get at the truth after hearing the soldier's side of the story. This puts the commander in a better position to determine what really happened.

Where the case is close and credibility key, the command should consider offering the soldier the opportunity to take a lie-detector test. Lie-detector tests are not considered sufficiently reliable to admit the results at trial, but they might be useful to the command in making difficult determinations when the facts are close and could help determine that the soldier did *not* commit the offense.

During the investigation, the soldier might choose to make a statement or tell his version of the case directly to the commander. The soldier will either have the right to do so, or he can request permission to speak during the adjudication of the case (such as during a letter of reprimand filing determination).[15] Generally, the commander should take full advantage of this opportunity and allow the soldier his day in court. This would allow the commander to observe the soldier's demeanor and to ask any questions the

investigation did not answer. Sometimes the commander's decision will turn on this appearance by the soldier. On adverse administrative matters in which the soldier has no right of appearance, the commander can and should grant the soldier the privilege of a personal audience at the soldier's request. As a general rule, commanders should err on the side of seeing the soldier, even where the soldier has no such right.

## Decide the Case

After a full, fair hearing on the facts, or in the case of certain adverse administrative actions, after reviewing all written materials and other evidence, the commander must make a decision in accordance with the facts, the law, and his conscience. The commander should keep in mind that the goal is to do justice. Toward that end, and to the extent practical, he should resolve any remaining issues before making a decision. He can and should rely on personal experiences and instincts in making the right decision. Again, when the facts are close, the commander should err on the side of the soldier. The system demands it.

Once the commander makes a decision, he should tell the soldier what his decision is and explain why he decided the case the way he did. This is also a good opportunity for the commander to counsel the soldier on the short- and long-term consequences of any adverse action, as well as the consequences of continued misconduct. The commander should also inform the soldier of the option to appeal the commander's actions if he desires.

## Fit Punishment to the Crime

In deciding appropriate punishment, the commander should impose only so much punishment as fits the crime. He or she should craft punishment to address the particular case of misconduct and the particular soldier at issue and resist the temptation to resolve all the Army's ills by exacting punishment in one particular case. The commander should seek to do justice in each and every case based on the merits of that particular case only. While general deterrence is an acceptable goal of punishment, the commander must ensure punishment is not disproportionately severe for the offense committed.[16]

When a commander imposes punishment, there are several key questions he should ask himself:

- Can I live with the standard set by the punishment? Because each case of misconduct and the resultant punishment sets a certain standard for soldiers in the unit, the commander should ask whether he could live with the standard set by the punishment. For example, a commander learns that the best soldier in the unit has tested positive for marijuana use during a urinalysis screening. The soldier confesses to the offense and admits to using extremely poor judgment by bowing to peer pressure while on leave. The commander wants to give the soldier a break because the sol-dier's conduct and duty performance have otherwise been exemplary. However, the commander decides to take a hard line in order to send a message to the entire unit that drug use is unacceptable and will not be tolerated, no matter who the offender is. The commander imposes a stiff punishment because it sends the right message and sets the right standard for the unit.
- Am I being consistent? The commander should ask whether his decision is consistent with similar decisions made regarding punishments. All things being equal, similar offenses should be punished similarly. Hence, two soldiers with equal or substantially equal quality of service should receive the same or similar punishment. Otherwise, the commander stands to be criticized for imposing punishment arbitrarily or capriciously. Whether commanders realize it or not, soldiers watch them closely, especially when it comes to basic fairness in matters such as reward and punishment. Accordingly, commanders must guard against even the appearance of not being evenhanded. Of course, on many occasions the quality of the offending soldiers will differ; therefore, differences in punishment are not only acceptable, they are appropriate. To ensure the unit understands these differences, commanders should explain their decisions to the chain of command or supervision and allow the information to filter down to members of the unit. In the end, notwithstanding what unit members might think, the commander must impose punishment in a fashion that ensures justice. To do less is unacceptable and cowardly.

## Follow Up

In most cases, imposition of punishment is not the final step for the commander. Follow-up actions, including various kinds of rehabilitative efforts, might be appropriate. Rehabilitation is especially important in cases involving soldiers who have addictions (alcohol, drugs, gambling). Commanders should refer soldiers with personality disorders or sociopathic tendencies to medical authorities. Because all post-punishment rehabilitative efforts must be carefully arranged and closely monitored, commanders should direct periodic briefings on the status of all rehabilitative efforts.

In addition to managing rehabilitative efforts, the commander must properly annotate personnel records, implement any forfeiture of pay or reduction in rank, plan and supervise extra duty and restrictions, or monitor suspended punishment until the period of suspension expires. The commander should also assess the soldier's overall record and value to the Army to determine if additional adverse administrative actions are merited.[17] Finally, to the extent that the case exposes deficiencies in the unit, the commander must take action to correct such deficiencies. Exposing shortcomings in a unit's functioning is not uncommon during cases of misconduct. Some common areas of deficiency might include the unit's counseling program, security measures, or rehabilitation program.

## Guarantee Fairness

Commanders who follow these guidelines can establish standard procedures for handling cases of misconduct to ensure the Army keeps "justice" in military justice. The result will be a standard leadership practice that guarantees every soldier the greatest measure of fairness. ***MR***

### NOTES

1. If the evidence does not meet the standard of proof, the suspect is considered not guilty or not responsible, as the case may be, depending on whether the proceedings are punitive or administrative.

2. U.S. Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, *Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers* (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 11 May 1988). *See also* "Rule of Court-Martial 303," *U.S. Manual for Court-Martial United States 1998* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998) for more information on a commander's inquiry.

3. Key personnel records include counseling statements, evaluation reports, the unit personnel file, the Military Personnel Records Jacket, Enlisted Records Brief, Personnel Qualification Record (DA Form 2-1), and the Officer Record Brief.

4. If an entry in the records shows that in the past a soldier was reduced in grade, but there is no further explanation in the record, the commander might want to investigate further to determine the reason for the reduction in grade.

5. The Judge Advocate General's School, *Senior Officer Legal Orientation Deskbook* (Charlottesville, VA: DA, April 2000), appendix A.

6. See AR 601-280, *Army Retention Program* (Washington, DC: DA, 31 March 1999), chapter 10. NOTE: The proponency and guidance for the Qualitative Management Program is moving to AR 635-200.

7. See AR 190-5, *Motor Vehicle Traffic Supervision* (Washington, DC: DA, 8 July 1988), 6.

8. Commanders usually make filing determinations on reprimands without holding a hearing. Generally, filing determinations are based on documents presented to the commander, including written recommendations from the chain of command.

9. See AR 600-8-2, *Suspension of Favorable Personnel Actions (Flags)* (Washington, DC: DA, 30 November 1987), paragraph 1.12a(3).

10. *See* AR 600-8-29, *Officer Promotions* (Washington, DC: DA, 30 November 1994), chapter 8.

11. Where the chain of command and chain of supervision are different, commanders should get input from whichever chain knows the soldier best if it is not possible to get input from both.

12. Social stigma is broad-based and can include ridicule from the unit and community, embarrassment caused by public knowledge of the discipline action, and even post-military job prejudice in the case of a court-martial conviction.

13. There are circumstances, however, under which the command should not inform the subject of an investigation until the time of apprehension. This includes circumstances where the subject might intimidate witnesses, tamper with evidence, or flee.

14. *See U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1951), vol. 10, section 831, as amended through 31 December 1998; See also *Miranda v. Arizona,* 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

15. A soldier has the right to speak at a court-martial, an Article 15 hearing, or at administrative separation proceedings.

16. General deterrence is the concept of imposing punishment in one case in such a manner as to discourage similar misconduct by others.

17. Administrative separation actions might be appropriate in cases where the soldier's record reflects a consistent pattern of misconduct.

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# MR Almanac

# Why the German People Went Willingly to Ruin

William J. Pellas

History is written by the victors. So goes the oft-repeated pithy proverb. While historians are aware that bias or myopia on the part of the victors might (or might not) cloud the objectivity of their chroniclers, they might still sometimes fail to perceive inaccuracies in popularly accepted interpretations or versions of events. So it is with the study of Adolf Hitler's Germany.

The United States was the dominant nation in the alliance that defeated Hitler's Germany and Tojo's Japan. Not surprising, then, is that most—although not all—of the best known and most popular accounts of the conflict emanated from the United States during the years following the war. Unfortunately, when it comes to the clash between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, some U.S. histories lack comprehensive detail, in particular in the long, tangled pre-war story that helps explain why so many otherwise seemingly reasonable Germans so eagerly sought battle with Soviet Russia.

Part of the answer lies in the paranoid nature of the Soviet State. Only in the last two decades have Russian documents relating to Operation Barbarossa been allowed to be seen outside the Kremlin's walls.[1] Another part of the answer lies in the limitations of U.S. involvement in the war as a whole. The strategic bombing campaigns, the Battle of the Atlantic, the Normandy landings, the Battle of the Bulge, the war with Japan; these were the distinctly American events of World War II. The primary U.S. contribution to the Eastern Front was in the area of logistics—supplying the Soviets with significant quantities of food, clothing, and munitions. The conflict was largely outside the U.S. experience, however, except for the sailors and airmen of the Murmansk supply convoys.

## German Motives

Popular culture has made its contribution to the often-inadequate understanding of German motives. Deconstructionist, even Marxist, scholarship has also played a part in oversimplifying or distorting the broader picture of the German reason de guerre.[2] Also, the simple passage of time and the passing away of living memory have served to gradually erode the presence of important, relevant information in the general public consciousness.

Nonetheless, simple racism and fanatical devotion to quasi-mystical Nazi totalitarianism—the obvious explanations—are not enough to account for nearly four years of horrendous German bloodshed. While these factors were certainly important, especially among the younger Germans of the time, still they do not entirely explain the willingness of the majority of the people and of the military (especially the High Command) to go along with the death struggle with Russia.[3] The true picture is more of a mosaic.

Among other things, Hitler was a World War I combat veteran. Although only a corporal, he nonetheless served with some distinction. As a battalion runner for the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, he was twice wounded in action and was even temporarily blinded by a British gas attack.[4]

Hitler's honorable experience gave him the usual cachet with the general public and, more important later, with the German military establishment. The experience also gave him the same sense of loss, moral indignation, and above all, towering rage that so many of his fellow citizens felt in the face of the High Command's demand that the government sue for peace, a move which seemed to Hitler an utter betrayal of the two million soldiers who had already given their lives for victory.[5]

"So it had all been in vain," Hitler himself recalled in *Mein Kampf*. "In vain all the sacrifices and privations . . . in vain the hours in which, with mortal fear clutching at our hearts, we nonetheless did our duty; in vain the death of two millions who died . . . . Had they died for this? Did all this happen only so that a gang of wretched criminals could lay hands on the Fatherland?"[6] Indeed,

so many soldiers had died in the fighting that thousands were never properly identified, only buried under gravestones marked "unknown."

Soon after war's end, France and England were at least able to retrieve most of the bodies of their fallen and either re-inter them on home soil or create formal cemeteries and build memorials to them where they fell. Germany was further humiliated after the Treaty of Versailles when the victors refused to allow similar monuments to the Kaiser's fallen troops. Thus, "the Germans were obliged to excavate mass graves in obscure locations to contain the remains of their casualties."[7]

Germany would long remember this insult added to the profound psychological and emotional shock suffered by all combatant nations in the Great War. Hitler later put this outrage to effective use when Nazi Party writers and propagandists began referring to him as the "unknown" corporal, the "living embodiment of the unknown soldier Weimar Germany had failed as a state to honor."[8]

## German Civil War

Inextricably interwoven with this sort of emotionalism was what amounted to a German civil war in the years immediately following World War I. Once the Kaiser abdicated, dozens if not hundreds of little wars were fought in the streets and countryside of Bavaria; along the eastern frontier of Germany (against the Poles and the peoples of the Baltic States); and throughout most of the provinces of the Fatherland.[9] The physical ruin of Germany, with the emotional ruin brought by defeat, created fertile soil in which demagoguery of all kinds flourished. Predictably, the major players who swiftly emerged in the struggle were leftist Bolsheviks and right-wing reactionaries.

In Munich in 1919, a party calling itself the Social Democrats set up a miniature Soviet state.[10] Significantly, the leader of this group was a Jewish writer named Kurt Eisner. After Eisner's assassination by an aristocratic Army officer, his followers became communist in name as well as by policy, but they did not last long. Army units from Berlin joined with freikorps—volunteers—and overthrew this infant Red government. Several hundred died.

In 1920, the moderate government that had followed the communist one was itself cast aside in favor of an Army-backed regime. Next, "the Bavarian capital became a magnet for all those forces in Germany which were determined to overthrow the Republic, set up an authoritarian regime and repudiate the Diktat of Versailles. . . . Here Ludendorff settled, along with a host of other disgruntled, discharged Army officers."[11] Ludendorff wrote to his wife to say that "with an easy conscience, I would have Ebert, Schedemann and Co. hanged, and watch them dangle."[12] Ebert and Schedemann were among the leaders of the national German government then current the—Weimar Republic. Anti-Semitism, already well established, was given more force by the fact that the Republic's Foreign Minister, Walter Rathenau, was a Jew, and the reactionaries hated him because he was responsible for the government's ongoing compliance with the treaty.

In Berlin, too, there had been a determined effort by communists to launch a Soviet state. This group, known as the "Spartacists," was finally crushed—at the behest of the infant Weimar Republic—by another joint Army-freikorps force.[13] This was certainly not the last of the communists, however. All through the early to mid 1920s they continued to battle with the forces of the right.[14]

What both groups had in common was a shared hatred of the Weimar government and of the Treaty of Versailles. Their proposed solutions to the German crisis, however, were diametric opposites. The left, of course, wished to join with its Russian counterpart in uniting the workers of the world in a planetwide glorious revolution. The right favored a strong and strongly nationalistic Germany, even a reinstitution of the monarchy. Thus, what eventually became Nazism might best be termed a counterrevolutionary movement.

In the background of these upheavals was the general poverty and wild inflation wrought by crippling war reparations, conditions further aggravated by the Great Depression. The widespread economic privations of the terms of the treaty forced on Germany are well documented, and it is a simple fact of human nature that empty stomachs make for a more suggestible populace. Taken in this context, it is not so hard to see from where Hitler's strident anti-Bolshevism originated, despite the obvious similarities between the future totalitarian states of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Nor is it difficult to see why he enjoyed so much popular, but by no means universal, support.

## German Nationalism

Faced with a choice between an unjust peace aided and abetted by a weak republic on the one hand and on the other hand the "worker's revolt," by Trotskyite definition opposed to strong German nationalism in favor of worldwide communism, it is not difficult to see why so many average Germans flocked to Hitler, even those who were not so convinced of Aryan evolutionary superiority over the hated untermunschen.[15] While the Weimar Republic enjoyed the support of most of the German Army and its officers, it was neither reactionary enough to satisfy the right nor liberal enough to satisfy the communists.

This battle for the soul of the German government was really not settled until Hitler finally came to power in 1933. The communists remained the most powerful of the opposition groups in Germany until Hitler finally crushed them. Their determined activism, significant popular support, and ideological connection with Soviet Russia made them, in perception and, probably, in reality, the biggest obstacle to power in the path of the Nazis.

It was a short leap in aberrant logic to connect the internal suppression of domestic communism with the external invasion of the country where it had first seen the light of day as an organized political system. German General Heinz Guderian offered this analysis of the volatile situation: "The reasons for the Germans' submission to Hitler's powers of suggestion must first be sought in the failure of policy as manifested by the victor nations after the First World War. This policy prepared the ground in which the seeds of National-Socialism were to take root; it gave us unemployment, heavy reparations, oppressive annexation of territory, lack of freedom, lack of equality, lack of military strength. . . . As a result, the man who now promised to free them from the bondage of

Versailles had a relatively easy task, particularly since the formal democracy of the Weimar Republic, try though it might, could achieve no significant successes in the diplomatic field and at home proved incapable of mastering Germany's internal difficulties. . . .

"Hitler promised the Germans that abroad he could free them from the injustices of Versailles and that at home he would abolish unemployment and party strife. These were aims which were entirely desirable and with which any good German must agree. Who would not have approved of them? At the beginning of his career this programme, to which all decent Germans heartily subscribed, brought him the support of millions of men who were beginning to doubt the ability of their politicians and the good will of their former enemies. As one futile conference succeeded the last, as reparations grew more intolerable, as our inequality was increasingly protracted, so more and more men turned to the swastika."[16]

In the last free elections before Hitler assumed total control of the German state, the communists still managed to accumulate six million votes, and they were just part of the spectrum that voted against the Nazis, who at the height of their democratic ascendancy only managed 37 percent of the vote.[17] Drastic measures were necessary if the Nazi vision was not to be stillborn. Fortunately for them, so to speak, "they had two advantages over their opponents. They were led by a man who knew exactly what he wanted, and they were ruthless enough and opportunistic enough to go to any lengths to help him get it."[18]

## Hitler Triumphant

Thus, following the 1940 Blitzkrieg, Hitler and Nazi Germany stood triumphant. All of Western Europe, with the lone exception of England, lay prostrate beneath the Nazi jackboot. Delirious with victory, supremely confident, and drunk with power, they turned next to "settle accounts with the Soviet Union," in no small measure to justify the twisted vision of Aryan racial superiority that had been brewing in Hitler's mind since the days of *Mein Kampf*.[19] For the committed Nazis, this was simply the next logical step. For most others who willingly joined the fight, the war with Russia was an anticommunist crusade. For far too many Germans from every segment of their society, it seemed only reasonable. ***MR***

### NOTES

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4. John Keegan, *The First World War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 195; William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany* (New York: MJF Books, 1959), 29-31.
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14. Ibid., 64-65.
15. W. Bruce Lincoln, *Red Victory, A History of the Russian Civil War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 522-3.
16. Guderian, 432-33.
17. Ibid; Shirer, 185.
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19. The Editors of Time-Life Books, *Barbarossa* (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1990), 18-19;

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# Payback in Staropromyslovsky

Ali M. Koknar

Between late December 1999 and mid-February 2000, Russian soldiers allegedly executed 41 Chechen civilians in 8 incidents in the Staropromyslovsky district, which is situated 5 kilometers to the northwest of the Chechen capital, Grozny. Most of the victims were women and elderly men, supposedly shot by Russians at close range.

Russian soldiers are said to have also committed many other abuses in the district, including looting and destroying civilian property and forcing residents of the town to risk sniper fire to recover the bodies of fallen Russian soldiers. Six Chechen men from the district who were last seen in Russian custody "disappeared" during the same period and remain unaccounted for.

Chechen witnesses reported that while most of the Russian soldiers occupying Staropromyslovsky were regular Russian Army soldiers, most of the alleged atrocities were committed by Russian Interior Ministry's (MVD) police special operations detachments known as Otryad Militsii Osobovo Naznacheniya (OMON) and Spetsialny Otriad po Bystromu Reagirovaniyu (SOBR).

Originally created in 1987 to deal with terrorist incidents, serious criminal activities, and the maintenance of public order, OMON units are organized like SWAT teams or light infantry, depending on their roles. The units, many members of which are veterans of the Afghan war and the first Chechen War of 1994-1996, also deploy to conflicts beyond their immediate operating areas. The Omonovtsy, as OMON soldiers are commonly called, commanded by Colonel-General Vyacheslav V. Ovchinnikov, are notorious for repressive lethal activities throughout the Russian Federation, often using false identities to avoid legal action against them.

## Blood Vengeance

Even as they were leaving Grozny in early February 2000, Chechen fighters took note of the OMON atrocities and began contemplating how to best mete out their own Caucasian brand of punishment on the perpetrators. Call it a blood feud, a vendetta, or just a plain old grudge, in the Chechens' book paybacks are big.

Chechen military discipline is not based on centralized hierarchy of command because the groups of combatants are usually small and are often formed independently by circles of relatives, neighbors, or friends. The three maintaining pillars of Chechen discipline are loyalty to family or clan; honor and shame (or custom); and Islam.

Blood vengeance ("ch'ir")—not feuding, but straightforward one-life-for-one-life vengeance with no further retaliation— serves to maintain order in a chaotic context where legal justice cannot always be expected. Creating grounds for blood vengeance—deliberate crimes such as murder or rape—is considered one of the most heinous and repugnant offenses in Chechen society, and this is exactly what the OMON was alleged to have perpetrated in the Staropromyslovsky district—the deliberately murder of Chechen civilians.

## Chechen Vengeance

After withdrawing from Grozny, Chechen guerrillas split into small groups in a bid to sneak undetected through Russian lines. About 300 fighters stayed inside Grozny, living in the extensive underground tunnels they had constructed. They surfaced at night in pitch-black conditions ideal for ambush to attack Russian patrols and to carry out surveillance of Russian movements in and around the city, which they relayed to Chechen commanders outside.

Isa Munayev, who had served as a police commander in Grozny before the war, was in charge of the city's defenses during the Russian siege until the Chechen withdrawal. He stayed behind Russian lines with his detachment of Chechen fighters and operated in the Staropromyslovsky district as well as the nearby villages of Andreyevskaya Dolina and Oktyabrsky.

The Staropromyslovsky district is generally known as one of the more unsafe places of the Chechen capital. Chechen guerrillas keep their ammunition caches in the area and lay ambushes in dilapidated buildings to attack federal forces or militia roadblocks even in daytime.

Munayev's men had conducted excellent reconnaissance and knew perfectly whom they would attack. The OMON convoy presented a soft target, as opposed to attacking an army column because the Russian Army traveled in BTR-60 and BTR-80 armored personnel carriers and BMP-3 tracked infantry fighting vehicles escorted by T-80 and T-90 main battle tanks with air support from Mi-24 HIND helicopter gunships.

So good was the Chechen preparation that after the ambush Russian authorities suspected a possible leak at the Russian operations headquarters in Mozdok, North Ossetia. The time of the ambush (1400 Moscow time) was also carefully selected. The area yielded thick fog in daytime, which provided concealment for the attacking Chechen fighters, whom the Russian soldiers began calling dusha (spirits), a term their older comrades had coined almost two decades earlier while fighting a cunning enemy in Afghanistan.

Chechen fighters identified the route that the OMON convoy would follow, and hours before the ambush, they began laying Russian-made TM-57 antitank and PMN antipersonnel land mines along a 350-meter stretch of the road and all exit routes. They had boosted some of the TM-57s with 120-millimeter mortar rounds and wired them as command-detonated mines. They also placed a few MON-50 directional antipersonnel mines similar to American Claymore mines on the sides of the road, so the mines would target OMON soldiers disembarking their vehicles. The MON-50s were also rigged for command-detonation.

The particular kill zone at the entry to Staropromyslovsky district was a quiet spot near Post 53, an OMON checkpoint and the convoy's final destination. On several occasions, the Russian government had declared the area safe, even vowing to set up polling booths there for the 26 March presidential elections.

The Chechens set up their firing positions carefully, with sufficient cover to protect them from return fire while still being able to engage targets using a crossfire pattern. After the ambush, Deputy Interior Minister Russian General Ivan Golubev described it as well prepared and skillfully designed.

## Ambush

As the Chechens waited for the OMON, a smaller convoy passed through the ambush site. Barely containing themselves and knowing that the OMON convoy would be an even bigger target, the Chechens allowed those vehicles to pass, although one of them was carrying a Russian Army general.

On 2 March 2000, 98 Omonovtsy, originally from the town of Sergiyev Posad 70 kilometers northeast of Moscow, were traveling in nine Russian-made canvas-top trucks. They left Mozdok, in North Ossetia, earlier that morning and headed for Post 53 to relieve the OMON unit on duty; it was the first day of the unit's second tour of duty in Chechnya. They had served previously during the first Chechen war of 1994-1996.

Shortly after the first OMON truck entered the kill zone and continued to roll, the Chechen commander detonated the pre-positioned mines, and Chechen PKMs opened up as grenadiers volley-fired several RPG-7 grenade launchers with high-explosive (HE) rounds at the trucks. The resulting series of blasts caused havoc in the Russian column.

In textbook fashion, the lead and last trucks were hit with RPG rounds first, making it impossible for the seven trucks between them to maneuver. Unable to exit the kill zone, and trapped in their trucks, the Omonovtsy began taking AK and PKM fire, which to the Russians—unable to see the Chechen positions enveloped in fog—seemed as if the fire was coming from everywhere.

The soft canvas tops of the Russian trucks offered no protection from incoming rounds. Many of the soldiers mowed down by Chechen fire had been so confident of their safety in a part of Chechnya miles from the front line that they were not wearing their body armor or helmets. Twelve soldiers were killed during the initial volley, including the unit's commander, Colonel Dimity Markelov. Five Omonovtsy were hit so many times that their bodies could not be properly identified for burial days after the ambush.

Chechen mortar crews also began firing, raining HE mortar shells on the trucks and the Russians trying to take cover among them. The Chechen commander then detonated the MON-50 antipersonnel mines, which burst out fragments at the panicked soldiers. During the first 6 minutes of the ambush, the Russian column had been hit either by RPG, mortar, or small-arms fire, and two out of every three OMON soldiers were either dead or wounded.

The element of surprise worked well for the Chechens. They took little return fire and lost no fighters, although a few were slightly

wounded. The OMON could not call in air strikes because they lacked the proper radio frequency to communicate with Russian Air Force headquarters at Khankala air base just outside of Grozny.

Later, the surviving OMON soldiers claimed they held off the Chechens for five hours until reinforcements arrived. Usually, a Chechen guerrilla ambush on a Russian column lasts no more than 15 minutes. In fact, by the time the backup OMON unit (home-based in Podolsk, also in the Moscow region like the ambushed unit) arrived 20 minutes into the battle, the convoy had been badly mauled. The reinforcements could not immediately engage the Chechen fighters because of the mines. The Chechens had even forecasted the Russians' reaction. Land mines placed the previous night prevented the OMON detachment from advancing toward the Chechen firing positions.

One surviving OMON officer charged that agents of the Federal Security Service, the KGB's successor, which handles intelligence, failed to notify them of Chechen guerrilla movements. The Defense Ministry responded with criticism that the police vehicles had rolled into an ambush in close formation, as if on parade.

The back up Omonovtsy from Post 53 lost two men on arrival, discovering the TM-57 antitank mines by detonating them. Chechen ambushers engaged them also, and the ensuing firefight continued for the next few hours. Deciding they had done enough damage, the Chechens picked up a few AKS-74s, RPG-7 launchers, and Makarovs, whose OMON owners were no longer alive, and fled, leaving behind only empty shell casings.

Russian Air Force and artillery units are usually only summoned to aid federal detachments if the situation is close to critical. When the Chechens ambushed the OMON column the Russians called in a mobile armored group to "assist." Planes and their artillery are next to useless in close-quarter combat when the distance between opposed forces is less than 100 meters.

As other Russian soldiers arrived at the ambush site, the body count grew. Two OMON soldiers died later of wounds in Grozny's Emergency Ministry Hospital, where they had been transported by helicopter. Out of the 98 OMON soldiers in the convoy, 37 were killed, or became "Cargo 200," the Russian military slang for killed in action. Thirty-one were "Cargo 300"—wounded in action.

Chechen commanders later claimed the Chechens had killed 60 Omonovtsy and wounded 35. The deputy commander of the ambushed OMON unit from Sergiyev Posad, Igor Luchikhin, blamed his and his deceased commanding officer's carelessness and lack of order for the death toll. Another survivor, Mikhail Simashkin, said that they had not expected such a ferocious attack in the Grozny area. Clearly, the OMON was caught completely off guard.

Chechen commanders claimed that only 13 fighters had executed the ambush. Although Russian officers conceded that as few as five experienced fighters could have staged the ambush with good preparation beforehand, they estimated that probably not less than 50 fighters had taken part. The true number of ambushers probably rests somewhere in between the two claims.

On hearing the news of the ambush, Russian interior minister Vladimir Rushailo, who bore the overall responsibility for OMON soldiers, called it a black day for the Russian police. He and senior OMON officer Vyacheslav Kozlovother suspected that local Chechens might have helped the guerrillas. OMON soldiers began raiding nearby homes and arrested 48 Chechen civilians on suspicion of taking part in the ambush. In the next few days, Rushailo blamed the commander in chief of interior soldiers for ignoring predetermined regulations on the movement of motor columns in Chechnya and ordered him to be replaced.

The ambush on the OMON soldiers, who are highly trained professionals, not "green" army conscripts, prompted Russian officials, such as President Vladimir Putin, to accuse security forces of carelessness. During the ambushed convoy's trip from Mozdok, the OMON commander, Colonel Dimity Markelov had been communicating by radio, and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov suspected that Chechens had intercepted his FM/UHF radio transmissions. As a result of this lesson-learned, the Russian Management Systems Agency was tasked with developing a secure tactical communication system for Russian forces.

The ambush also underscored the need for individual protection for soldiers, prompting the Russian command to issue orders for extra security measures for convoys in Chechnya, including helicopter escorts, special reconnaissance before setting out from base, and a ban on convoy movements during bad weather.

## An Eye for an Eye

Hours after the ambush, not too far from the Staropromyslovsky district, five Russian soldiers were found with their throats slit, raising the Russian death toll to 42. As far as the Chechens were concerned, they had taken ch'ir revenge. Forty-two Russians paid for the lives of the 41 Chechen civilians who had been murdered in Staropromyslovsky district.

In the weeks and months that followed the bloody ambush in the Black Hole, as the OMON dubbed Staropromyslovsky, Chechens continued attacking Russian forces in the district. They fired on blockposts with mortars and small arms, ambushed other troop convoys traveling through, lay mines and command-detonated explosives on roads, and placed bombs under parked police and military vehicles.

The Black Hole continues to be a favorite semi-urban stage on which Chechen fighters conduct attacks against the occupying Russia forces. During the first half of 2002 alone, in and around Staropromyslovsky, Chechens successfully laid antitank mines (some radio-controlled) that have killed and wounded scores of Russian soldiers. ***MR***

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# MR Bookshelf

# Middle East Security Policy: Catching Up Through Reading

Lieutenant Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

Various U.S. Army and Navy groups often ask me which books they should read about Islamic militancy, Persian Gulf stability, and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. The following reading list includes short descriptions of recently published books that address the issues.

## Islamic Militancy

We must address and understand Islamic militancy within the context of the history of the Persian Gulf region. To merely be aware of key figures and events of Islamic militancy is not sufficient. We need to comprehend how Islamic militancy evolved and what caused key actors to develop as they did within the moderate regimes of the Middle East. Also of concern are Islamic militancy networks and their access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Peter Bergen's ***Holy War Inc.*** (New York: The Free Press, 2001) discusses Islamic militant networks and provides insight into Osama bin-Laden and the development of the Al-Qaeda organization. Readers will gain knowledge of how the globalization of Islamic militancy began in the trenches of Afghanistan during the fight against the Russians. After the war, Islamic soldiers returned to their respective Islamic organizations infused with a new sense of armed struggle. The Al-Qaeda formed a loose network with Egyptian, Yemeni, Sudanese, and other Islamic radical groups who wished to topple their respective regimes to usher in Islamic states. Bergen, formerly with ABC News, describes Al-Qaeda as a corporate structure with political, military, financial, training, and logistics departments. His book offers a baseline understanding of this notorious group.

Augmenting Bergen's book is Walter Laquer's ***The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Laquer holds The Henry Kissinger Chair for National Security Policy and is a prolific writer on national security affairs. In *The New Terrorism*, he breaks the evolution of terrorism into what he calls "waves." The 19th century was an era of nationalist-separatist terrorism. The 1960s and 1970s had a leftist, communist-inspired tendency. The latter 20th century saw the arrival of religion- and rightist-inspired terrorism.

Laquer compiles a profile of a suicide bomber who is studying the so-called martyrs of the HAMAS (the Islamic Resistance Movement) and Hezbollah (Islamic fundamentalists) organizations and describes the fanaticism and paranoia that grip these organizations. He dedicates a chapter to WMD and the likely organizations that would employ them. Not all terrorists groups see WMD use as a viable political alternative, and only a handful sees such mass-murderous tactics as viable means to achieve their objectives.

For centuries Egypt has been the birthplace for positive and negative Islamic ideas. It is home to Sheikh Hassan al-Banna, founder of the earliest Islamic radical movement—the Al-Ikhwaan Al-Muslimeen. Sayed Qutb wrote the first pamphlet, ***Guideposts*** (no publisher information available), that advocated the removal of a Muslim leader allied with the West or with the communists.

Mary Anne Weaver's book, ***Portrait of Egypt: A Journey Through the World of Militant Islam*** (New York: Farrar, Straus and Girroux, 1999) reveals how current government and economic conditions are breeding grounds for Islamic militancy. Weaver provides insightful anecdotes that illustrate why these violent radicals hate the United States.

Mark Huband's book, ***Warriors of the Prophet: The Struggle for Islam*** (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), presents a powerful caution to policymakers not to fall into the trap of the clash of civilizations theory Samuel P. Huntington postulates in ***The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*** (New York: Touchstone Books, 1998). That there are so many countries within the Islamic world that differ in culture, history, and political identity, coupled with the debate among Muslims over secularism, monarchists, theocracies, and democracies, precludes an "Islam Against the West Theory." The book also describes Islamic movements in North Africa and the Middle East.

## Persian Gulf Stability

An important cornerstone of U.S. policy is to promote stability among our Arab allies in the Persian Gulf area. To do so, analysts must forecast divisions and potential sources of revolt that could topple the Al-Saud family. The United States does not want to be caught by a surprise revolution such as that which occurred against the Shah of Iran in 1979. We cannot simply rely on government sources for an accurate picture of intelligence and regional politics.

United States and allied dependence on Saudi oil demands a close examination of the region and an understanding of the Al-Saud family's power base. In addition, the United States should monitor closely disputes among the Gulf States, including border disagreements. Iraq is the greatest source of instability in the Gulf region. Understanding Saddam Hussein's intentions as well as the very real forces that could topple his regime is necessary.

The stability of Saudi Arabia is always of concern to the United States. Instability in Saudi Arabia could have repercussions on energy markets, U.S. Armed Forces based in

the region, Persian Gulf stability, and potential Iraqi military intervention. Nowhere is instability as apparent as in the Al-Saud family's royal-succession process. Although dated, Alexander Bligh's book, ***From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud*** (New York University Press, 1984), is key to understanding the significance of Saudi appointments and the posturing of various branches of the Al-Saud family. This has become more urgent as new generations of Abdul Aziz's grandsons become eligible for kingship.

Several groups of dissenters are calling for the downfall of the monarchy. Mamoun Fandy's book, ***Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent*** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), covers six organizations bent on addressing corruption, unemployment rates, and a lack of religious following in Saudi Arabia. Many of these organizations feel that the United States controls the royal family and dominates Saudi Arabian policies. I do not believe these organizations can topple the Saudi regime; however, if they merge with elements of the Saudi National Guard, they might succeed in their goals of creating an Islamic state in Arabia.

Gary Sick and Lawrence Porter are the editors of ***The Changing Face of the Persian Gulf at the 21st Century*** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), which is a collection of essays about changes in the Persian Gulf region that could lead to instability. I highly recommend this book.

Essayist Richard Scofield describes the border disputes between Iraq and Iran, Iraq and Kuwait, as well as Iran and the United Arab Emirates. He also discusses Bahrain's claim to the islands annexed by Qatar and Saudi Arabia and Qatar's disagreement about the delineation of their respective borders. In her essay, Munira Fakhro reveals the growing need for democratization and analyzes the 1994 uprising in Bahrain.

Any nation that must interact with Saddam Hussein must understand that he is a dictator driven to achieve one thing—survival. Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi wrote the first political biography of Saddam after the Gulf War—***Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography*** (New York: The Free Press, 1991). Readers are transported into a world of violent Iraqi politics focused on Saddam's desire to survive at all costs. When threatened, Saddam will strike with all the forces at his command. Should he feel boxed into a corner, he will not hesitate to use chemical and biological weapons. Analyzing Saddam's rise to power helps predict his future actions but also explains why his call for a jihad did not resonate with Muslims around the world.

## Israeli-Palestinian Dispute

The Israeli-Palestinian dispute continues to be a source of concern for any U.S. administration. Efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of this conflict will no doubt continue to be a source of instability in the region. Islamic militants use this issue as a main source of grievance toward the West.

John Gee's book, ***Unequal Conflict*** (Brooklyn, NY: Olive Branch Press, 1998), details the evolution of the State of Israel and the disadvantage the Palestinians have in politically defending their homeland against a well-organized, articulate European Jewish effort to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. This book is intriguing because it explores the myths created by both sides regarding their claims to the land. Gee argues that before a peaceful resolution can be found such myths must be shattered.

Those who argue that peace in the region is impossible should read Uri Savir's book, ***Talking with the Enemy Through Secret Back Channels*** (New York: Random House, 1998), which tells of the secret negotiations (the Oslo Accords of 1993) that lasted 1,100 days in Oslo, Norway, between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Such secret and unofficial communications are key to solving the region's many problems and to providing a dialog among the several governments that want to see an end to violence. Savir profiles the Palestinian negotiating team, which could be a model for assessing other Palestinian negotiators who, hopefully, will resume talks after the current round of violence.

Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal wrote ***Palestinians, the Making of a People*** (New York: The Free Press, 1993) out of frustration with a Jewish society that regarded the Palestinian people as nonentities. Searching for the sparks that have or will ignite Palestinian violence, they explore key events from the 1936 Arab Revolt to the 1987 Intifadah.

Yasser Arafat has been called many things, but for now, he is holding tenuously to his post as the head of the Palestinian Authority, the PLO, and sole representative of the Palestinian people. Andrew Gowers and Tony Walker's biography, ***Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution*** (Brooklyn, NY: Olive Branch Press, 1991), deals truthfully with Arafat's role in key events in Palestinian history. Some of the mythology that Arafat has produced to enhance his political credentials includes his exact birthplace and the true extent of damage caused by the 1966 raids into Israel. Arafat watched from exile in Tunis as the Intifadah raged on in 1987 and took a wait-and-see approach before endorsing the revolt. After seizing control of the uprising and finally arriving in Gaza after the Oslo Accords, Gazan leaders warned Arafat about the Palestinian-Tunisian group who were lining their pockets and could not have cared less for the cause of independence. The warning fell on deaf ears. Had Arafat paid attention, Hamas would not now be so popular in the Occupied Territories.

The ***Historical Dictionary of Terrorism,*** edited by Sean K. Anderson and Stephen Sloan (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2002), is a must for readers who want to know more about the actors and organizations these books mention.

## Thoughtful Reading

The important issues these books cover are the issues behind the instability of the Persian Gulf region, but the issues are not independent. They are often linked in subtle ways and are essential reading for thoughtful readers who want to know how the past affects current events. ***MR***

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# MR Book Reviews

**HITLER'S TRAITOR: Martin Bormann and the Defeat of the Reich,** Louis Kilzer, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 2000, 290 pages, $29.95.

Writing about war is a continuation of politics by another means (with apologies to Clausewitz). U.S. history books and most books written by U.S. authors go to great lengths to dissect facts, explain actions, and enlighten readers about U.S. war activities. With a few notable exceptions, works about the European Theater are confined to U.S. and British actions to defeat Nazi Germany. Consequently, most Americans are woefully uninformed about the tremendous contributions and unbelievable sacrifices the Soviet Union made toward that same goal.

In *Hitler's Traitor: Martin Bormann and the Defeat of the Reich,* Louis Kilzer examines the war from the Soviet viewpoint. In particular, he writes about a German informant named Werther, who fed information to the Soviets. Kilzer contends that six to eight people involved in a Soviet spy ring were directly responsible for the Soviet Union's ability to defeat German dictator Adolf Hitler's forces. Hitler had better equipment, generals, and troops, yet Stalin and his generals were able to thwart all of Hitler's plans. Why? Stalin had knowledge of Hitler's plans, troop dispositions, timelines, and the attitudes of his commanders even before the forces in the field did. The only way this was possible was if the information was coming from Hitler's innermost circle.

Kilzer gives in-depth information gathered from previously classified documents about the type and depth of information Stalin received from his prized informant. Kilzer discusses the climate around Hitler that enabled and, perhaps, encouraged such treason. The reader learns how the information was passed from Germany to Moscow and what happened to most of the actors in the drama. Finally, Kilzer details why he believes Werther was none other than Martin Bormann, Hitler's second in command.

The book, a fascinating account of political machinations and incredible blunders, reads like a spy novel, but it has the advantage of being true. Kilzer presents his material in an entertaining manner while providing an entirely new perspective on an old mystery.

**David G. Rathgeber,** ***MCTSSA, Camp Pendleton, California***

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**THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941,** Harold Winton and David R. Mets, eds., University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2000, 247 pages, $50.00.

The title of the book, *The Challenge of Change,* could easily serve as the theme for an upcoming issue of *Military Review*. The topics covered—army transformation, technological innovation, military culture, and strategic assessment—are ones that will resonate with military professionals. Yet, because this anthology is a scholarly investigation of the period between the world wars, not a celebration of emerging doctrine or Force XXI technology (the words "leverage" and "asymmetric" appear not once), the contents deserve special attention. By looking at how the armies of France, Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States transformed themselves during the interwar years, the authors of this collection give historical perspectives and points of comparison for the problems the U.S. Army currently faces.

Each author, an acknowledged expert in his field, has been involved with the professional education of officers. Harold Winton offers the introduction plus a fascinating essay on Great Britain's inability to resolve the problems of empire maintenance, shrinking budgets, and competing egos in a fractious military culture. Eugenia Kiesling analyzes France's failed effort to reconcile short-term conscription, the perceived lessons of World War I, and a re-arming Germany. James Corum portrays the interwar German Army as a body able to institutionalize tactical excellence in its officer education and combined arms training even as Hitler was purging its strategic thinkers. Jay Kipp contributes a fascinating piece showing how the Soviet Army rose from the wreckage of the Tsarist military to become a modern, mechanized force that led the world in its theoretical development of the operational level of war.

In examining the U.S. Army between the wars, David Johnson offers an especially jarring thesis. The generally accepted view of the 1920s and 1930s is one of a stingy Congress crippling the Army's efforts to modernize. Johnson suggests otherwise: Service culture and branch rivalries were the true obstacles to transforming the force.

Dennis Showalter provides the most provocative element of the book. In a fascinating analogy, he compares World War I to a light-refracting prism. In 1914, the major armies approached the prism on roughly the same course: each was built on the two-divisions-to-a-corps, nation-in-arms model pioneered by Prussia in the late 19th century. The Great War served to refract their paths as each derived unique lessons from the experiences of 1914-1918. The French, for example, chose the route of methodical attack built on massive artillery support and centralized control. The Germans emphasized combined arms, maneuver, and decentralized control. The Soviets combined communist ideology with the lessons from their own civil war in developing a massed, mechanized army.

As Showalter analyzes these divergent paths, he tweaks our preconceived notions about winners and losers in the game of adaptation. The

French are usually held up as the ones who failed to adapt, yet Showalter finds that the French methodical attack anticipated the methods of Russian, British, and U.S. commanders during the last half of World War II. Perhaps the French got it right too soon. Showalter surprises us by suggesting the Germans changed least of all in the years between the war. More than anything else, the Wehrmacht capitalized and improved on the techniques developed in the first war. Their bag of tricks, Showalter reminds us, came up empty somewhere on the road between Smolensk and Moscow.

Showalter's is a thought-provoking conclusion to a book crammed with important ideas. The historian will value the book for prodding us to look at the interwar period in a new light. The military professional will find it useful for its description of the pitfalls of both inadequate and ill-conceived transformations.

**LTC Scott Stephenson, *USA, Retired,***
***Leavenworth, Kansas***

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**MAGIC: The Untold Story of U.S. Intelligence and the Evacuation of Japanese Residents from the West Coast during World War II,** David D. Lowman, Athena Press, Inc., Provo, UT, 2001, 391 pages, $29.95.

David D. Lowman was a career intelligence officer for the National Security Agency. His last assignment before retirement was special assistant to the director. One of Lowman's major assignments involved declassifying intelligence records, including sources from MAGIC, the decrypted Japanese diplomatic signal traffic. Some of that material, intercepted and decoded from late 1941 through early 1942 and incorporated into this book, describes Japan's systematic recruitment of U.S. Japanese residents, citizens, and noncitizens into networks designed to provide critical national-security and defense information before and after the outbreak of war.

The information gathered from various U.S. intelligence agencies and presented to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his key advisers revealed a creditable threat to the national security of the United States and its allies. The book reveals that this information gave knowledgeable senior-level personnel in the administration a firm belief that if a large number of Japanese were free to move about inside and outside U.S. borders, they would become a major threat to national security.

Lowman's evidence refutes the accepted history that the evacuation was solely the result of national leaders' "racism, war hysteria and the lack of political will." He also relates how intelligence was ignored or misrepresented by those seeking compensation from the U.S. Government for wartime evacuation and internment.

**Richard L. Milligan, *Ph.D.,***
***Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

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**HITLER'S AUSTRIA: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938-1945,** Evan Burr Bukey, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2000, 320 pages, $39.95.

During the past few decades, historians have conducted many groundbreaking and significant studies designed to demonstrate historical trends and events from the perspective of ordinary citizens. The era of National Socialism in Germany is a historical period of which such studies are prolific.

Evan Burr Bukey conducts a similar evaluation for a small portion of the German Reich—Austria—in his book *Hitler's Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938-1945.* Bukey shapes his analysis in the same manner as Ian Kershaw, a historian who has contributed tremendously to the field of social history. Although Bukey admits that he has never met Kershaw, the latter's influence over this book is quite marked. As such, this is Bukey's attempt to determine the "collective dispositions of society" in Austria throughout the period of the entire Third Reich.

The study begins with a look at Germany's incorporation of Austria—renamed the Ostmark—into German dictator Adolf Hitler's Empire in 1938 and carries forward through World War II. Bukey demonstrates the nuances of Austrian Nazism and popular sentiment as well as the inconsistencies between the Alpine State and the core German Reich. Three inconsistencies run as continuous threads throughout the book and stand out as particularly worthwhile to the reader.

First, Bukey demonstrates the factional nature of Nazism in Austria, aggravated by Berlin's tendency to send homegrown Nazis to assume positions of leadership and authority within the party apparatus in Austria after the Anschluss. In many cases, these carpetbagging interlopers pushed Austrian Nazi leaders, always a "fractious and discordant group," into the political background. The result was substantial friction throughout the war years between the two groups.

Second, Bukey addresses the tension between civilians within the Reich and the Ostmark. The tension was created and exacerbated by divergent aims among numerous groups, such as urban and rural residents or native and tourist populations.

Finally, Bukey highlights the unique elements of popular sentiment that resulted from the fact that, for much of the war, Austria was not a prime target of Allied bombing missions or ground combat. Not only did these considerations affect the Austrian population's opinions of the war in general, they also made the fear of bombing, both perceived and realized, much more significant.

Given the noteworthy and tangible strengths of this work, there are some areas where Bukey's analysis is wanting. Although comparisons are difficult to avoid, Bukey almost devotes too much effort contrasting Austria with Germany, and he does not allow the Austrian experience to stand on its own merits. While some juxtaposition certainly is necessary and effectively demonstrated in some situations, most notably the continuous examination of Austria's discordant Nazism, in other areas it leads to disconnected examination of important themes. Most prominent in this regard is the Austrian populace's approach to the Jewish Question and anti-Semitism. The topic jumps in and out of Bukey's narrative, yet he never really addresses the root causes of anti-Semitism in Austria.

While Austria's war experience might have ended with a whimper

rather than a bang, the way in which the country and the Austrian people have struggled to come to grips with the experience of the Third Reich merits a deeper examination. Bukey lets discussion end rather ingloriously, especially considering his rather tendentious comment that "more disturbing than the persistence of authoritarian thoughts, habits, and opinions was the survival of widespread anti-Semitism" after the war. This comment alone invites a wonderful opportunity for debate and discussion, yet it serves only as a finale.

Nonetheless, Bukey provides a fascinating glimpse inside the Ostmark's social world. He raises intriguing questions about the role of the Austrian populace in the successes and failures of Hitler's regime, particularly those on the periphery of the German political landscape. His work serves as an excellent beginning to new fields of study.

**MAJ Michael A. Boden,** ***USAR, Schweinfurt, Germany***

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**GREEN BERETS IN THE VANGUARD: Inside Special Forces, 1953-1963,** Chalmers Archer, Jr., Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2001, 139 pages, $29.95.

In *Green Berets in the Vanguard,* Chalmers Archer, Jr., as a black man during the early days of integration in the military, offers a unique historical perspective on U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) during its formatives years. Archer, a medical sergeant during the early days of Special Forces, skillfully blends his capabilities as an award-winning writer and educator with his military experience to produce a thoughtful, captivating story.

Archer has an uncanny knack of offering macro and micro perspectives of situations on the ground. While offering strategic suggestions of SF employment, he also speaks authoritatively on the local norms and customs of the host nation (HN) people with whom he served. Archer pays attention to what happened at the grassroots level and ties actions clearly into a strategic framework.

Archer views SF soldiers as field diplomats, trainers, leaders, and fighters. He bases his account on a variety of missions and operations that took him to Hawaii, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, Okinawa, and Laos. He stresses the values of teamwork, commitment, courage, and community. The values-based, multifaceted roles and human dimensions of Special Forces are themes Archer carries superbly throughout the book.

A variety of colorful vignettes help explain the SF legacy. Archer tells of the origins of the green beret, shoulder sleeve insignia, early relations with other government agencies, training HN soldiers, and the gap between policymakers and the troops who had to execute the policy on the ground. He ends the book with insightful lessons learned and a wise look toward the future.

**MAJ Fred T. Krawchuk,** ***USA, Europe***

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**ALL FOR THE REGIMENT: The Army of the Ohio, 1861-1862,** Gerald J. Prokopowicz, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, 280 pages, $34.95.

In April 1861, President Abraham Lincoln called for volunteers from the loyal states to suppress the rebellion initiated after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, Virginia. The states began organizing regiments, which were sent by the U.S. War Department to perceived threatened areas, such as the area between Washington, D.C., and Richmond, Virginia. The regiments eventually became the Army of the Potomac—the most celebrated of the Union armies.

Kentucky was another threatened area. Lincoln wanted the state to remain neutral. Some regiments were sent to areas near Cincinnati and other Ohio River locations to control the threat. These regiments eventually became the Army of the Ohio, which is arguably the least documented of the Civil War armies. In *All for the Regiment: The Army of the Ohio, 1861-1862,* Gerald J. Prokopowicz offers an overdue history of this important Army.

Prokopowicz's thesis is that the Army of the Ohio's regiments were generally proficient and capable units but, when joined with other equally qualified regiments, the resulting units performed poorly. Prokopowicz believes the poor performance of these higher echelon units (brigades, divisions, and corps) was the result of regimental pride and conceit combined with an unwillingness or inability of leaders to command at higher levels. He believes the Army of the Ohio consisted of skillful regiments that could not be made into or led to be a good field army.

While the book provides interesting insight into unit esprit de corps, it is not a comprehensive history: it lacks details on the many skirmishes and battles that a complete history of a Civil War field army would require, and we never see the battles from the Confederate perspective.

Prokopowicz ends the book when, after the Battle of Perryville, the Army of the Ohio changed its name to the Army of the Cumberland. The reader is left wondering if regimental harmony described up to October 1862 continued throughout the war.

**LTC Jeffrey J. Gudmens,** ***USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

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**WORLD WAR II: The Pacific,** F. Weaver and E. Herrmenn, narrators and eds., The History Channel Audio Books, Simon and Schuster, NY, 8 tapes, running time: 4 hours, $26.00.

This package of eight audiotapes is from selected programs from The History Channel about World War II battles in the Pacific. The tapes' titles announce their content and level of sophistication: "The Road to Infamy"; "Unsung Heroes of Pearl Harbor"; "Japanese War Crimes and Trials"; "Murder Under the Sun"; "Tarawa—Correspondents from Hell"; "The Flag Raisers of Iwo Jima."

As one might suspect from their titles, the tapes are highly dramatized, jingoistic versions of military history prepared, one must assume, for consumption by junior high school students who are considering enlistment in the military. Neither subject nor the manner of presentation pretends to being unbiased, scholarly, or anything more than recounts of heroic deeds of U.S. sailors and marines during the Pacific Campaign of World War II.

No indication is evident that these eight tapes are forerunners of a more extensive publishing effort in audio form of the original Military History

Channel series of audiovisual TV presentations, which contained some vivid visual footage. Taken alone, these tapes have little value. For audio history to be of value, it must be designed for its intended purpose, not used as an afterthought or as a source of revenue.

**RADM Ben Eiseman,** ***USNR, Retired, Denver, Colorado***

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**ONE OF CUSTER'S WOLVERINES: The Civil War Letters of Brevet Brigadier General James H. Kidd,** Eric J. Wittenberg, ed., Kent State University Press, Kent, OH, 2000, 264 pages, $35.00.

In *One of Custer's Wolverines,* Eric J. Wittenberg, preeminent biographer of Brigadier General James H. Kidd, provides a glimpse into the personal life of this little-known Civil War cavalry soldier and commander. Wittenberg uses Kidd's letters, written during the Civil War, to illustrate the exploits of General George Armstrong Custer's Michigan Cavalry Brigade. This valuable insight, from one who was intimately close to Custer during his formative years, provides a rare portrait of the type of young cavalier who took the reins to follow Custer.

Kidd's letters are exceptionally well written, clear in thought, and remarkably frank. In preparing and editing the various letters, Wittenberg manages to weave a tale of one of the less heralded cavalry units that fought during the Civil War. The letters are interspersed with reflections and reminiscences of activities occurring elsewhere during the same period. The result is a poignant, touching look into the mind of a young man living through experiences that shaped the course of a nation.

**MAJ Steven Leonard,** ***USA, Fort Campbell, Kentucky***

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**INTELLIGENCE AND THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN: Britain, America, and the Politics of Secret Service,** Richard J. Aldrich, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2000, 483 pages, $34.95.

Often a book on a seemingly arcane subject can illuminate an entire field or time period. Richard J. Aldrich's book, *Intelligence and the War Against Japan,* prods the reader into reconsidering some of the shibboleths of the history of American diplomacy and foreign policy, namely the ineptitude of diplomatic and intelligence operations in Asia during World War II. This prodigiously researched and well-written book details wartime policy contradictions and their implications for postwar policies toward South and Southeast Asia.

Much of the writing about World War II British and American intelligence organizations concentrates on activities in Europe. Historians deem this struggle more significant in forming and maturing both countries' espionage organizations and laying the foundation for a close postwar "special" relationship. Their histories deemphasized national rivalries while emphasizing cooperation. As Aldrich shows us, however, intelligence activities in Asia provided a much truer picture of wartime and postwar political activities and goals.

The espionage wars the British and Americans fought against each other and the Japanese occurred in separate geographic compartments. Frequently physically isolated, the only day-to-day contact between the two powers was through their respective intelligence organizations. As Aldrich and other scholars discovered, these agencies were subject to little effective day-to-day control from Washington and London.

Intelligence gathering and analysis was the growth industry of World War II. Machine encryption and decryption made these aspects of intelligence operations industrial in scope and left agents more time for long-range analyses of various powers' political, military, and commercial interests. British and American organizations, created and operated in competition with colleagues and allies, saw themselves as crucial instruments of national policy. Often, they concentrated on creating a postwar world that would benefit their respective institutional and national interests.

Because British and American services assumed they would defeat the Japanese, they concentrated on watching each other and collecting political and commercial intelligence on their respective governments' postwar policies. There was much to watch; national rivalries and competition ignored in Europe were impossible to ignore in Asia.

Aldrich shows the ways internal and external rivalries between the two sets of intelligence agencies grew. Americans, he concludes, were motivated by anticolonialism and an aversion to be seen as the musclemen for European imperialism. This led them to develop their own links with nationalist movements and leaders that resulted in a "Great Game" between the two sets of secret services in the region. At one point relations were so bad between them that the U.S. 14th Air Force (operating in China) reported that it had probably shot down two British aircraft carrying infiltration agents into French Indochina.

This book gives two true views of Anglo-American intelligence relations. The first view is the conventional one of the two allies acting in concert against the Axis powers. The second view emphasizes that both were cognizant of long-term national interests in the region. The British became fearful of aggressive, energetic, and "corporatist" U.S. political and commercial penetration of their empire. Neither view contradicts the other.

**Lewis Bernstein,** ***Ph.D., Huntsville, Alabama***

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**THE GENIUS OF ROBERT E. LEE: Leadership Lessons for the Outgunned, Outnumbered, and Underfinanced,** Al Kaltman, Prentice Hall Press, Paramus, NJ, 2000, 352 pages, $24.00.

*The Genius of Robert E. Lee* is an excellent book that provides unique insight into professional growth and leadership. Although author Al Kaltman focuses more on management techniques and development, readers can use the information to develop their own fundamental leadership principles and insights.

The current trend in the Army is to attempt to identify core problems of leadership shortfalls that answer the question of why the Army is losing its junior leaders. This is a weighty undertaking, and there are many complex solutions. Kaltman uses the writings and recorded actions of Lee on which to base each of his management principles. He

expounds on about 250 key events in Lee's life and links each to a principle.

Kaltman divides the principles into 12 major groupings; such as, "Pull Out All the Stops," "Prepare Yourself," "Take Command," "Continuous Improvement," and the "Winning Image." Some lessons learned are so delicate, yet so powerful, that I found myself wondering why they are not stressed to young leaders. Subjects include "Don't Take It Personally," "Turf Squabbles," "Bad Mouthing," "No One's Out to Get You," "Respect and Consideration," "Don't Take Them for Granted," and so on.

Where does the Army teach these powerful lessons? Are they taught at the service academies, Officer Candidate School, basic and advanced courses, or the Command and General Staff Officers Course? As an institution, the Army is good at teaching concepts represented by buzzwords, such as "Army Values," but which institution teaches such subtleties as are found in this book?

Professional officers and noncommissioned officers should read and digest the information in this book. They should reflect deeply on each principle, then put it into practice. The ability to work basic leadership skills into everyday life and pass them on to junior leaders is critical to institutional growth.

**LTC Billy J. Hadfield, *USA,***
***Beaver Creek, Ohio***

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**THE 1865 CUSTOMS OF SERVICE FOR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS: A Handbook for the Rank and File of the Army,** August V. Kautz, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2001, 303 pages, $14.95.

Stackpole's reprint of the 1865 handbook is a valuable reference tool for Civil War historians or reenactors. This edition contains essential information that soldiers and noncommissioned officers needed to know about military responsibilities at the time. The practical subjects helped them survive the rigors of campaigning.

August V. Kautz, a German immigrant who graduated from West Point in 1852, was a career officer. During his service, he recognized that the enlisted soldier was "dependent upon tradition for a knowledge of his specific duties." There was no written guide for learning what soldiers needed to know to perform their duties proficiently. Kautz wrote, therefore, what he referred to as a "handbook," and Congress authorized its publication in 1864, with a revised edition being published the following year.

The handbook included instructions on how to seek an appointment to West Point and a summary of the courses that a cadet would take during his four years there. For soldiers desiring to become officers, Kautz gives an abstract of the pertinent regulation along with a list of subjects to be covered during an examination.

The book also covers the duties expected of soldiers up to the rank of sergeant major in garrison and in the field. There is information on pay and allowances, identification of rank, courts-martial and punishment, types of paroles for prisoners, and pensions.

Because of the prevalence of disease at the time Kautz wrote the handbook, it has a section on cooking and another titled "Take Care of Your Health." Twelve pages are devoted to firing during battle. There are sections that provide information of specific importance to soldiers of infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineer, ordnance, and signal units. Of particular value to the historian is a list of the Articles of War.

Reproduction and publication of this handbook provide the serious student of the Civil War with an exceptional primary source document. Anyone studying, writing about, or reenacting military subjects and the Civil War is encouraged to have this book in his or her personal library.

**Richard L. Kiper, *Ph.D.,***
***Leavenworth, Kansas***

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**GREEN COATS AND GLORY: The United States Regiment of Riflemen, 1808-1821,** John C. Fredriksen, Fort Niagara Publications, Youngstown, OH, 2000, 77 pages, $12.95.

Although the United States is famous for being a nation of riflemen, at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, the U.S. Army did not have a rifle to its name. Various states maintained rifle formations, but Regulars were armed with smoothbore muskets. As the nation expanded, a corps of riflemen was required for frontier defense.

*Green Coats and Glory,* winner of the Harold L. Peterson Award for best

essay on military history, provides an excellent, if brief, history of the U.S. Army Rifle Regiment. Recruited from frontiersmen for scouting and skirmishing, the regiment established an excellent record in open combat. The regiment was armed with the 1803 Harper Ferry Rifle, which had no provision for a bayonet in an age when half the reason for a longarm was to provide a bayonet mount. Detailed accounts of battles show that the Riflemen made up for their slow rate of fire with accuracy. The rifle regiment was considered an elite unit—the Special Operations Force of its day. However, the regiment's elan gave rise to accusations of indiscipline, and its politically appointed officers provided uneven leadership.

Author John C. Fredricksen provides clear illustrations of the unit's unique uniform and weapons. His excellent research and clear writing provide a compelling history of an early light infantry formation and leave the reader wishing for more.

**Kevin L. Jamison,** ***Attorney at Law, Gladstone, Missouri***

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**THE MAN WHO FLEW THE MEMPHIS BELLE,** Robert Morgan with Ron Powers, Penguin Group Publishing, New York, 2001, 388 pages, $25.95.

A considerable number of books have been released lately about World War II, especially personal reflections on the war from individual perspectives. Such works are quite revealing, but more important, they capture the intimate thoughts on a generation of veterans. Most of the stories have never before been heard; others are better known. The *Memphis Belle* is one of the better known stories—or is it?

In *The Man Who Flew the Memphis Belle*, Colonel Robert Morgan and Ron Powers admirably capture the dramatic events surrounding the story of the famed World War II B-17 bomber nicknamed *The Memphis Belle* and the lesser known story of Morgan, the *Belles*' pilot. *The Memphis Belle* and her crew were the focus of a 1944 war documentary as the first bomber crew to survive 25 combat missions over Europe during World War II. The crew returned to a sensation at home in 1943 and were employed in a nationwide bond tour to support the war effort.

What Morgan and Powers do effectively is to fully develop the background of Morgan's youth, training, and combat experiences in the fledgling U.S. Army Air Forces in England. Readers who are familiar with *The Memphis Belle* story soon discover there is a whole lot more to know. The story is a human diary of emotions, a window into pre-war America, and a history of the dark days of the American war experience in 1942. The book also describes the bomber effort in the Pacific, as the story follows Morgan to the Pacific Theater where, as a squadron commander, he pilots the new B-29 during 26 missions against Japanese targets.

*The Man Who Flew the Memphis Belle* is an honest American story full of personal successes and failures. For that reason alone it is an enjoyable book. Yet, it is also a historical window into American's early involvement in World War II and a riveting story of aerial combat in which many died who would never know how much they contributed. I highly recommend this book.

**MAJ Ted J. Behncke, Sr.,** ***USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

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**THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR: Operational Art, 1904-1940,** Richard W. Harrison, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2001, 351 pages, $39.95.

In *The Russian Way of War*, Department of Defense investigator Richard W. Harrison explores the intellectual development of Russian military thought. The book opens on the 1905 Russo-Japanese War and concludes with an analysis of activities that occurred on the eve of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Some might consider that studying Russian and Soviet doctrine is passé, but the reality is that many developing nations embraced Soviet doctrine, and others, such as the People's Republic of China, absorbed copious amounts of Russian military hardware. Although Russia's political landscape has changed, its military is still formidable. Embedded in parts of this book are descriptions that are the antecedents to Iraqi and Yugoslav military styles of operations.

Beginning as early as 1920, Generals V.K. Triandafalov and M.N. Tukhachevskii wrote prolifically on the need to mechanize the Soviet cavalry. Hardened by their experiences of trench warfare, they envisioned a multidimensional battlefield employing rapid-moving infantry supported by air forces and static artillery.

Soviet military thinkers were tuned into the importance of destroying centers of gravity and the enemy's ability to sustain war. Among the Russian military thinkers Harrison cites is General N. Kaputsin, who wanted to develop a specialized group composed of mechanized infantry supported by engineering units, that could break through first-echelon defenses. However, Kaputsin could not see beyond trench warfare and was among those caught unprepared by the German Army's "blitzkrieg."

Harrison also tells the amazing story of how Poland fell to the Germans in 1939; France fell a year later. Soviet politicians blamed the debacle on western forms of governments and decadence and refused to consider that the Nazis might have developed new tactics of warfare. Also of interest is the Russian view their national security for five decades and how they sought to counter Asian and European threats. Further enlightening is how greatly the tank revolutionized Russian military thought.

This book, which should be of interest to tacticians and military school graduates alike, offers a world beyond the writings of western military thinking to which we have grown accustomed.

**LT Youssef Aboul-Enein,** ***USN, Gaithersburg, Maryland***

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**AIR-MECH-STRIKE: 3-Dimensional Phalanx,** David L. Grange, Huba Wass De Czege, Richard D. Liebert, Charles A. Jarnot, and Michael L. Sparks, Turner Publishing Co., Paducah, KY, 2000, 311 pages, $24.95.

The U.S. Army currently stands on the leading edge of a wide-ranging transformation—a transformation to a more deployable, lethal force than the current array of heavy and light divisions. In *Air-Mech-Strike*, David L. Grange et al., challenge the Army to look more closely at how it plans to maneuver forces on the next battlefield. Impressive in its scope of research and detail, the book is absolutely intriguing in the analysis of

tactical employment.

The authors have done an excellent job of gathering historical background from around the world; allies and enemies alike have struggled to solve the problem of operational agility. The authors reviewed German, Russian, British, and American efforts to combine ground assets with aerial platforms. It is clear throughout the various historical accounts that no unit successfully accomplished the marriage of air and ground down to the level articulated by Grange and his esteemed cast of co-authors.

As a former member of the 101st Airborne Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, I am intrigued by the thought of actually providing increased firepower and mobility to light forces while allowing mechanized forces to take advantage of air assault flexibility. Imagine the possibility of air assaulting a mechanized company up and over the Tiefort Mountains to attack an opposing force from an unexpected flank. The same could be said for airborne or air assault troops having increased firepower and mobility on the airhead line.

The book's single greatest drawback lies in its poor editing and organization, which cause it to be exceptionally difficult to read. The book seems to have been hastily cobbled together to take advantage of the chief of staff's emphasis on immediate transformation. Unexpected font shifts coupled with grammatical errors make it difficult to absorb the material, thus reducing the message's effectiveness. The book should be restructured with appendices for tables of organization and equipment; historical chapters should be gathered in a single section of three or four chapters; and the annotation should be pushed to a final bibliography as opposed to strewn haphazardly throughout the text. The Korean and Kuwaiti situation maps do little to depict clearly how the proposed formations will fight in either theater; the same might be said for the various photos and slides found throughout the book.

In closing, I reiterate; this book generates honest thought on another possible method to increase agility and lethality on the modern battlefield. One of the strongest points is that most of the proposed structure changes take advantage of current, existing materials or technology. Commercial off-the-shelf acquisition is a key method of rapid development and testing of new concepts, and this book asks, in this era of Transformation, "Why not try this while we're at it?"

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